In the past 30 years, my discipline, political science, has undergone truly massive changes with respect to both subject matter and method. Until the late 1940s, the political scientist was concerned primarily with the formal institutions of government and classical political theory. Law and the values underlying it, together with a liberal admixture of history, dominated political studies. Moreover, attention was directed mainly toward Western societies. Even among non-Western scholars trained in the discipline, however, similar traits prevailed. Thus, in both Japan and China, legalism held away, with many learned treatises on constitutionalism, parliamentary systems and political thought being produced.
Then came the explosive political developments that followed World War II. A multitude of new political societies emerged, and it quickly became clear that a study of the formal political institutions associated with them provided limited insight at best into the essence of their political systems. Those of us who were Americans were confronted with the task of looking far beyond our own culture. This in itself emphasized the previous narrowness and ethnocentrism that had characterized our discipline. There followed a veritable revolution in the study of politics, as is well known. A wide range of new questions were now asked. What were the factors producing political stability on the one hand, or political upheaval on the other? Who constituted the political elite? How and for what purposes did they manipulate power? What was the nature of the decision making process? How was mass allegiance secured and maintained? These are but a small sample of the type of issues to which political scientists now turned. Inevitably, a new vocabulary and new methodologies evolved, with extensive borrowing from such sister disciplines as anthropology, sociology, economics and psychology taking place.
The revolution in contemporary political science continues, even as the merits and weaknesses of various methods are hotly debated. Certainly, there is no consensus at present on the best approach to the study of politics. Some of the new methodologies, indeed, have already come under serious attack, and in my opinion, justifiably so. lt can also be argued that institutional and legal studies, particularly when placed in the broader context available today, are far more important than has recently been acknowledged. Whatever the outcome of current discussions, however, political science will not return to the molds of the past. Its present broader concerns are legitimate, even if the methods of approaching them remain far from perfected.
How do these considerations relate to the study of Chinese Communism? First, let us look briefly at the background. American scholars turned their attention to Chinese Communism only after the Communists had come to power. Previously, this field had been left largely to journalists - and a handful of government officials, most of whose writings were not publicly available at the time. This should not be surprising. The training of China specialists only began in the United States on any appreciable scale after World War II. And it should be remembered that even in the case of social science studies of the Soviet Union, output was negligible until, with the advent of the cold war, a crash program was instituted with major foundation support at several of our leading universities.
Historians took the leading role in initiating American studies on Chinese Communism, most of them trained as intellectual historians. Again, this was a natural development, given the back ground of Chinese studies in general, and the nature of the primary training centers. As one consequence, much early American writing on Chinese Communism emphasizes - and quite possibly, over-emphasizes - the intellectual element, with heavy stress upon theoretical disputation. Only with the onset of the 1960s did a number of studies by social scientists begin to appear with the leading American foundations once more chiefly responsible for making such research possible.
Dr. Han Lih-wu, director of the Institute of International Relations, presided at opening of Taipei seminar. (File photo)
From the beginning, the problems of research for political scientists concerned with contemporary China have been formidable, and basically, they are the type of problems with which our specialists on the Soviet Union have wrestled for years. Let us start with the question of sources. Documentary materials on Chinese Communism, past and present, are relatively voluminous, as is well known to students of the subject, and many have not yet been fully exploited. Many of these sources have come to us from Taiwan, and to those who made the Chen Cheng collection and other archival materials available to us, we are deeply indebted.
There is no substitute for original primary source materials of the type represented by Communist journals, newspapers, leaflets, and party directives and resolutions. Yet anyone who has worked extensively with such materials knows that there are a number of pitfalls and certain difficulties that can never be wholly avoided. First, there is the question of authenticity, an infrequent but occasionally critical matter, especially when it involves "secret" party expositions or instructions, or purported accounts of factional intrigue. The more common problem, however, relates to the use made of this type of materials. How does one separate out hard fact and revealing clues from sheer propaganda and false tracks, deliberate or otherwise. How can one make certain that one is reading between the lines correctly, and accurately interpreting both the omissions and what is said?
Hindsight, of course, is of considerable aid here. But a number of mysteries pertaining to the Communist movement, and more particularly, to the operational aspects of the Communist system, cannot be answered by reference to such sources. In general, official materials are most useful in discerning basic Communist policies; perceptions of foes and of the international environment; issues of greatest immediate concern to the leadership; and the nature of mobilization efforts. They are least useful in revealing individual and group elite relationships; operational aspects of the political system; and attitudes at both public and cadre levels.
Some important lacunae in such sources must also be noted. Looking back into history, we can assume that there is a vast array of memoranda and reports written by Com intern functionaries stored in Moscow - only a few of which have reached us. Authentic official transcripts of key conferences and Politburo meetings are rare indeed. Much of the data available, moreover, relates to the Center. To my knowledge, we have nothing that resembles the Smolensk records from which the late Professor Merle Fainsod produced a monograph giving us exceedingly valuable insights into the politics and governance of a Soviet city.
What supplementary sources are available, beyond materials of the type which we have been discussing? Fortunately, we have a sizable number of memoirs and briefer accounts written by men who were themselves involved in the movement at one point, or who were its opponents and on the-scene observers. These works are indispensable in many cases because they shed light upon precisely the matters ignored or treated lightly in official sources, namely, interpersonal relations, private motivations, policy conflicts and operational techniques. Since these accounts have been written by men holding a range of perspectives and positions, moreover, some cross-checking is possible.
While asserting the importance of these materials, however, we must also acknowledge their shortcomings. The human memory is often faulty. Not infrequently, when we have three memoirs, we also have three different versions of the same episode. More importantly, the individual does not exist who fails to emphasize those events in which he figured prominently, and in such a manner as to make his own record a credible one, that of his opponents less so. Finally, the key memoirs at present are those of historic personages, with Chang Kuo-t'ao leading the list. We have no counterpart, or near counterpart for the post 1949 period. As is well known, Ch'en Shao-yu is the sole Central Committee member to have left the mainland as a defector from the Maoist order, and he was clearly separated from any key decision-making post for many years prior to his flight. In any case, will it be possible for the Western scholar to talk with him, or for him to write his own account from his Moscow exile? What a tragedy that men like Lin Piao and Liu Shao-ch'i cannot leave the scholar a first-hand, unvarnished account of their interpretation of the past 25 years!
Thus, we are dependent upon relatively low ranking defectors, most of whom have departed for personal or economic reasons. A few are local cadres or minor officials. Most are unhappy youth, escaping from the countryside. The overwhelming majority are from Kwangtung, having reached Hongkong from that neighboring province. What is the value of in-depth interviews with such individuals? No question relating to sources has been more vigorously debated among American scholars. Admittedly, the data may be unreliable, since one is dealing with dissidents only. Sometimes, actual frauds are committed, either because the individual is anxious to please, wants to earn more money, or for other reasons. As we have noted, moreover, these individuals tend to come from one geographic region, and frequently know very little about conditions elsewhere. Finally, one often finds idiosyncratic features in a respondent, either with respect to personality or background that make generalizations hazardous.
Nevertheless, it is my view that such sources can be very useful under certain conditions and for certain purposes. Assuming that the individual is of the type described above, his primary contributions can be with respect to local activities social, economic and political - in which he was a direct participant. At this level, he should be able to shed some light upon style, procedures and linkages. In addition, this respondent should be able to provide a detailed description of his own life style, and that of others immediately around him. Possibly, he can also convey his perceptions of such institutions as the party and its leaders - local, regional and national.
A single interview of this type may be worth very little, unless it is focused upon the life of a particular individual who has had a distinctive role. The social scientist is normally interested in cumulative data of the type that can certify more generalized conclusions. This requires a range of respondents with such differences in age, origin, education and occupation as conditions will permit. Such interviews are likely to be useful, moreover, in direct proportion to the prior knowledge of the interviewer. Normally, this should constitute the last stage of one's research, after all available written sources have been consulted.
Are we now entering a period when interviews with defectors will be less meaningful because the scholar will have access to the Chinese mainland on an expanded scale? Will some foreign scholars, including Americans, be able to conduct interviews with leading political actors, past or present, or at least with representatives of various socio economic categories living in this Communist state? And what is the value of such interviews?
Dr. Theodore Chen of U. of Southern California, left, and Wu Chen-tsai, Kuomintang cultural chief. (File photo)
These questions raise a number of considerations, each of which must be treated separately. Cultural exchange with the "People's Republic of China" seems likely to expand, but Chou En-Iai has made it clear that "the time is not yet ripe" for extensive exchanges among social scientists. If our experience with the Soviet Union is any guide (and one should admit that there could be significant differences), research opportunities of all types for the foreign political scientist within (mainland) China are likely to be extremely limited for the foreseeable future. Most of us will have to be satisfied with brief trips during which we tread well-worn paths.
The prospects are not wholly bleak, however. First, it is possible that a few authorized interviews with top leaders will be granted to American scholars. Indeed, Chiang Ching has reportedly done this, making herself available for a lengthy series of interviews with Roxanne Witke, a young American historian. The value of such interviews remains to be tested, and a number of problems are posed for the scholar in connection with them. Nevertheless, one would be foolish to fail to take advantage of any opportunities of this sort presented, as long as no strictures are placed upon the product that would affect the integrity of one's work.
More importantly, even brief trips to the "People's Republic" enable one to explore in considerable depth some facets of life and politics in this society. Let me make it emphatically clear that such a trip cannot provide definitive answers to any of the truly major questions that currently surround that state. For example, does political stability or instability lie ahead? Is the current economic system viable? What will Peiping's role be in the international arena? Is the goal of creating a New Socialist Man succeeding? These are crucial questions, and I repeat, a trip will not provide answers to them, or quite possibly, even well-founded hypotheses. Nevertheless, some of us have discovered that it is possible to have serious, substantive discussions on a wide range of subjects, and to obtain answers to many specific questions. Particularly illuminating have been our discussions on the planning process, the operation of such local level administrative units as the Street Committee, provincial-level educational activities and factory management. It has also been possible to obtain detailed information on wages and prices.
A trip to the "People's Republic of China" can be highly misleading under certain conditions, and it is my personal conviction that the accounts of some returnees have been marked either by an extraordinary naivite or deeply rooted commitments. To be sure, one's response to what one sees, in (mainland) China or elsewhere, is partially governed by one's personal, political and cultural biases, and none of us can free ourselves totally from such biases. It is always hazardous, moreover, for the totally uninitiated to take any managed trip. Yet I strongly disagree with those who regard a trip to the" People's Republic" as meaningless for the American scholar. If approached with seriousness and some rigor in preparation, it can be an important learning experience, and valuable for certain specific research purposes, albeit, in no sense a substitute for the other re search sources previously discussed.
With respect to sources, let me conclude with a brief reference to the importance of contact between the American scholar and the Asian scholar, particularly scholars of the Republic of China on Taiwan and Japan working on Chinese Communism. Such contact can cover a wide gamut from collaborative research and conferences such as this one, where our respective research is subject to scrutiny and criticism, to more casual interaction, including methodological aid or assistance in the interpretation of documentary materials. True collaborative research is very difficult, but speaking personally, I have also found it highly rewarding. In any case, the American social scientist needs the counsel of those who share his substantive interests, but who can bring to the subject an indigenous or similar cultural perspective, a total familiarity with the language, and possibly, a different interpretive emphasis. In exchange, the American scholar can perhaps offer useful methodological and analytical approaches.
Let us turn now from the question of sources to an even more complex matter, namely, the broad direction which our research is taking, and some of the problems which we as American social scientists are encountering. Necessarily, the comments that follow will represent a personal perspective since I cannot presume to speak for scholars other than myself, and there is surely no consensus in the American academic 'community on these matters. Moreover, I intend to concentrate upon issues confronting my sub-group, the political scientists.
In the period immediately after World War II, American research on the politics of non Western societies tended to focus upon national level politics, and was directed toward such questions as the qualities of leadership, the effectiveness of leaders and regimes in relating to nationalism, and the proximity of new governments to parliamentarism and Western-style democracy. Almost uniformly, research was undertaken during this period on a single-nation basis.
Subsequently, the work produced in this era has been criticized as betraying an ethnocentric, liberal bias. No doubt that criticism has some justification. The United States had just participated in a global war on behalf of what it believed to be democratic values, and faith in the liberal-democratic system ran high. Indeed, Americans were attempting to tutor the defeated Japanese and Germans in democratic institutions and values. But it should also be remembered that new elites everywhere, including Communist elites, were insisting that their commitments were to democracy. At the time, it seemed that certain concepts had achieved universal acceptance: progress, nationalism, modernization and democracy. The sticking point, of course, lay in how one defined such a term as democracy, but it did not appear inappropriate to most American scholars to use political choice and civil liberties as two prominent criteria.
By the beginning of the 1960s, however, a renewed interest in a value-free social science had emerged, and all discipline including political science were being affected. This was certainly not a new issue, as the students of German social science can testify. Why did the movement in this direction become strong at this particular point? Various reasons can be cited, but in the field of comparative politics, one important cause lay in the fact that the new societies were exhibiting a great diversity of political forms, with few of them precisely in the mold of the classical Western democratic state. It seemed increasingly important to understand various systems rather than to concentrate upon evaluating them in ethical or political terms. The quest thus began for typologies that would encompass all political possibilities, together with new descriptive and analytical tools that would aid in revealing their essential characteristics. This search, as can be appreciated, was closely connected with the broader trends in methodology noted at the outset of this paper.
Research on Chinese Communist politics was naturally affected. Descriptive, analytical studies dealing with such topics as administrative management, mass organizations and elites now began to make their appearance. At the macrosocietal level, there was a serious effort to deal more thoroughly with differentiated elements such as the military, the bureaucracy and the party. But greatly increased attention was now devoted to microsocietal studies - the city, the commune and the local administrative unit. As one result, new elements of diversity and complexity have been injected into our understanding of Chinese Communism, including the strong contrast between theory and practice at many points. These developments, it might be added, have been paralleled in the field of Soviet studies, and have contributed to a movement away from reliance upon the totalitarian model in the study of Communist societies in general.
Together with the basic trends sketched above, an effort has begun to move toward genuine comparative studies, namely, to compare and contrast such political systems as that of the "People's Republic of China" with those of other states. This effort, which is still in its embryonic stages, has raised a host of difficult intriguing questions. With what systems should (mainland) China be compared? Should the comparison concentrate upon other Communist systems, notably the U.S.S.R., the state from which so much ideological, institutional, and policy borrowing took place? Or should the "People's Republic of China" be com pared with other "emerging" societies, states dedicated to the same broad goals of nation-building and economic development? There is a final alternative, namely, a comparison between contemporary and traditional China in an effort to discover what has truly changed, and what elements of continuity remain - or more accurately, an examination of the forces of rejection and adaptation in the current political system. In point of fact, of course, each of these comparisons has its validity, and in the long run, some combination of the three will probably yield the most fruitful results.
The trends so briefly set forth here are still under way. In recent years, however, yet another movement has emerged, one borne out of the "radicalization" of certain scholars in connection with the events of the 1960's, and notably the Vietnam War.
Prof. Paul Sih, left, of St. John's University in New York and Prof. Chow Ching-wen of Hongkong. (File photo)
The possibility of a value-free social science has been challenged, and it has been charged that in fact, such a concept camouflages political biases on behalf of the status-quo and a deeply rooted ethnocentrism.
For the most part, this new movement flies revisionist banners and openly proclaims itself as dedicated to value-oriented scholarship. The movement has thus far been dominated by historians, or at least shown a strong historical bent, with efforts to portray past American policies toward Asia (and the world) as totally misguided, and prime examples of cultural, economic and political imperialism. Marxian or quasi-Marxian interpretations figure heavily into most of these writings.
As might be expected, the China specialists among this group exhibit a strong sympathy for the Chinese Communist movement, past and present. By demanding that events be seen through Chinese eyes (in itself a request possessing logic) and by equating Chinese eyes with the Communists, proponents of the new movement at once proclaim themselves free of ethnocentrism and display their political commitments.
Yet there are some striking paradoxes in the so-called New Left school. In its own way, this movement is at least as ethnocentric as the Western liberal observers of the past whom it would challenge. It insists upon translating its wholly critical view of contemporary America into a vision of the New China. Thus, when one reads reports or scholarly treatises emanating from its members, one frequently comes to realize that it is a critique of the United States, not a balanced portrayal of (mainland) China, that is being presented. When it comes to (mainland) China, moreover, a surprisingly high percentage of the work is characterized by inferior scholarship, namely, the careless and extremely selective use of data. In some cases at least, the author appears to feel that he is sufficiently covered by the frank admission that his values are honestly being displayed. Scholar ship, in this fashion, is dedicated to the service of partisanship. Very recently, certain individuals associated with the movement who are more professional in their attitudes toward scholarship have themselves begun to raise precisely the questions that go to the heart of this problem.
A few serious works on (mainland) China have been produced by the so-called New Left or revisionist scholars. But a great deal of inferior work measured against any standard - has also come forth. It would be a mistake, however, to see this group as clearly fixed in its ideological position. Almost none of its members can be considered Communists, or even full-fledged Marxists, despite the sympathy often displayed for the Chinese Communists, and the utilization of Marxian concepts. Most, indeed, have a vague anarchist, or anarcho-syndicalist flavor to their values, reflective of the issues confronting the post-modern society. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of them find Mao compatible because they regard him as Janus-faced with respect to the problems of freedom and authority. Undoubtedly, since values are uppermost in the minds of the revisionists, disillusionment will come in many cases, either because the Chinese Communists engage in "rightist" or "leftist" deviations from the values assigned for them to meet - and indeed, in a few cases, that process already seems underway, spark ed by Peiping's identification with President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger.
How should we view the future of American scholarship on Chinese Communism? The handicaps under which we operate will continue to be substantial, and made more complex no doubt by the rapidity of change likely to characterize developments in the "People's Republic." It will be difficult if not impossible for the political scientist - American or other - to produce a seminal work on Chinese Communist politics at this juncture. Writings must continue to be partial, tentative and preliminary for the most part, especially as they deal with the national scene in its broadest reaches. For this reason scholars in this and related disciplines may find it more satisfying to work at the micro-societal level, or at least to subject selective aspects of national politics to detailed treatment. Thus, some would argue that the historian can make the most lasting contribution at this point in time, if he is prepared to look through many different eyes at the past, and take into account the full range of conflicting, diversified data. He too, however, must currently suffer under many of the limitations which we set forth earlier.
Nevertheless, there are grounds for some optimism. Younger generations of American scholars are emerging, many of them possessing better technical training and lingUistic tools than those of the older generation. Moreover, the so-called New Left does not command the allegiance of all younger scholars by any means, nor are its current adherents necessarily permanent ones. Ethnocentrism and political bias will always constitute a problem - and obviously not a uniquely American one - but there is an awareness of this fact in the scholarly community at present, and one can scarcely ask for more than this. It is possible, moreover, that the widening horizons of scholarly intercourse and exchange across cultures will provide the most meaningful corrective force in these respects. In sum, the coming years may well be fruitful as well as frustrating ones for the American social scientist committed to the study of China.